Saturday, September 29, 2007
Physical Office Space
Thursday, September 13, 2007
Bathroom Advertising
Thursday, August 30, 2007
Selling a Cause of Action
Monday, August 27, 2007
Specialization
As a profession, we should resist this urge to specialize. We may make more money, but it's about more than that.
Wednesday, August 15, 2007
Sixth Circuit and Twombly - New Decision
Today the CA6 came out with its first decision regarding pleadings since the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly. This provides those of us who practice in the Federal District Courts that make up the CA6 (Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio and Michigan) with the first insight into how the CA6 believes pleadings are effected by Twombly.
The case is Lindsay v. Yates, N0. 06-4430, an appeal from a decision of the Northern District of Ohio. The District Court had dismissed the complaint for failure to plead facts sufficient to establish each element of a primar facie case of racial discrimination. Although the dismissal was pursuant to Federal Rule 12(c), the standard is the same as that for dismissal under 12(b)(6) and arguably Twombly applies. The CA6 had this to say about Twombly, and it's heightened pleading requirements:
Swierkiewicz was discussed extensively by the dissent in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). Twombly addressed requirements for pleading an antitrust claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act. The dissent argued that the Twombly majority had devised a “new pleading rule” that called into question the continued vitality of Swierkiewicz. 127 S. Ct. at 1974 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Because the Supreme Court majority distinguished Swierkiewicz and nowhere expressed an intent to overturn it, we have no basis for concluding that Swierkiewicz is no longer good law. Moreover, although this case does not present the question of if, or exactly how, Twombly has changed the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), we note that in Erickson v. Pardus, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007), decided after Twombly, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that Rule 8(a) “requires only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. At 2200 (internal quotation marks omitted) (concluding that the petitioner had stated an Eighth Amendment claim where he alleged that prison officials had endangered his life by removing him from hepatitis C medication shortly after he began a year-long treatment regimen, that he was still in need of the treatment, and that prison officials continued to deny him treatment). In any event, for the reasons described infra, we conclude that the Lindsays have pleaded sufficient facts giving rise to a “reasonably founded hope that the discovery process will reveal relevant evidence” to support their claims. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967 (internal quotation marks omitted).
From this, it seems that the CA6 is willing to provide somewhat less scrutiny to complaints than many think is required by Twombly. They place reliance upon the Erickson case, decided after Twombly, in which the Supreme Court appeared to utilize the old pleading rules, thus the complaint in the instant case was upheld.
I imagine that this is just the first of many cases in which the CA6, and the other circuits, will struggle to define what the exact requirements actually are. Perhaps the Supreme Court will clarify in the upcoming term, or at the very least, the term after that.
Friday, August 10, 2007
Virtual Office Space
I suppose a big part of our business still favors style over substance. However, there is a cure. A company called Regus has developed a series of "Virtual Offices." These offer you a physical location, usually downtown or in other business friendly locations. For a low price, around $200.00, you get a local phone number, someone to answer that phone, voice mail, mail forwarding and two days a month of time you can actually use the office. Need it more? There is a package that gives you five days a month. And it appears that you can, for additional fees, get time in meeting rooms, etc, on a first come, first served basis.
This would seem to be a perfect place to have to meet clients, conduct depositions and do other tasks that normally require a physical location. I am toying with the idea of getting into one of their buildings in the downtown Nashville area.
The article didn't mention whether anyone had looked at the ethics of these arrangements. At first blush, I think it's ok. It would probably be best if you disclose to the clients what the arrangement is. It might be considered deceitful if you hold out that "This is my office" leading people to believe that you are renting the (expensive) space on a full time basis. And some states have rules regarding lawyers sharing office space with non-lawyers, requiring special action to preserve client confidences, etc. Still, overall, I think it should be ok and that perhaps the various boards should look at the rules and revise them a bit to better fit the modern way of doing business.
I have not yet decided to go this route, but I am considering it. I get quite a few inquiries from Tennessee, but not a lot of conversions. There could be many reasons for this, but one might be not having an office to get the clients into for meetings and to discuss their legal matters. An office with Regus might help that along.
The ABA Article can be read at:
Tuesday, August 7, 2007
Ghost Lawyering, Part II
Last May, the ABA issued an opinion that might be of help to attorneys who practice in Model Rule States. The opinion states that ghost lawyering is permissible under the ABA Model Rules, so long as local rules do not prohibit the practice.
The article goes on to discuss the concept of attorneys who draft documents that are filed by other attorneys. This is of particular interest to me, as the largest part of my practice consists of doing exactly that. The article quotes New York University law professor Stephen Gillers, an expert on legal ethics, as saying that lawyers who draft pleadings and briefs for other lawyers don't violate the ethics rules, since the filing attorney takes responsibility for the work. One would hope that Professor Gillers opinion would carry weight with any Board of Professional Responsibility that examines the issue.
Basically, it comes down to this - as lawyers we need to consult the rules of the jurisdiction to make sure that we're on the right side of the (blurry and sometimes shifting) line. My personal opinion is that there is nothing wrong with the practice. Certainly not with respect to my practice of authoring documents that other lawyers file, but also not with respect to the pro se litigants. It is our duty as lawyers to help those in need of legal services. Ghost lawyering for a pro se filer can, in some circumstances, enable someone to put their case before a court when otherwise they would not be able to. To my way of thinking, that is a good thing.
I am going to use a feature of the new blog hosting site I am using and put up an opinion poll on Ghost Lawyering to see what people think of it. You can read the ABA Journal article online at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/scary_parts_of_ghostwriting/. The article contains a link to the New Jersey decision sanctioning the attorney who engaged in ghost lawyering for the pro se litigant, then vote in the poll on the left hand side of this page to make your opinion known.
~Tim